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The Staten Island Day-Fine Project 
by Laura A. Winterfield and Sally T. Hillsman 
Day fines, so called because the amount of 
the fine is tied to an offender's daily earn-
ings, are common in some European and 
South American countries; not so in the 
United States, where fines have tradition-
ally been based on the individual crime 
rather than on the individual offender's 
ability to pay. 
But as American jurisprudence seeks alter-
natives in sentencing, day fines have been 
.Jroposed as one promising area of experi-
mentation. This Research in Brief de-
scribes the first day-fine experiment in 
American courts, a National Institute of 
Justice (NIJ) project planned and imple-
mented between 1987 and 1989 in the 
Criminal Court of Richmond County 
(Staten Island), New York. 1 This joint 
project of NIJ, the court, and the Vera 
Institute of Justice was also supported by 
the German Marshall Fund of the United 
States and New York City's Office of the 
Deputy Mayor for Public Safety. 
From the Director 
Fines, as a method of criminal punishment, 
date to the beginnings of the criminal justice 
system, commonly being applied when the 
offense was not sufficiently serious to 
warrant incarceration and the offender 
presented no grave threat to the community. 
One problem, however, with fines as pun-
ishment lies in the difficulty in making the 
punishment fit the crime. · 
The National Institute of Justice (NIJ), the 
research and development arm of the U.S. 
Department of Justice, has studied the 
application of fines as an alternative means 
An NIJ evaluation of this successful 
implementation demonstrated that: 
• The day-fine concept could be 
implemented in a typical American 
limited-jurisdiction court. 
• Day fines could substitute for 
fixed fines. 
• Fine amounts were higher for affluent 
offenders under the day-fine system. 
• Overall revenues increased. 
• High rates of collection could be sus-
tained (and possibly improved) despite the 
higher average day-fine amounts. 
Evolution of day fines 
Fines are an ancient and widely used penal 
. measure, and noncustodial sanctions are 
not new in American sentencing. What is 
new is an increased enthusiasm for the 
of punishment in appropriate situations and for 
appropriate offenders. Research has shown 
that determining what should be paid, what can 
be paid, and what will be paid is never easy. 
The Institute has recently explored a method of 
imposing fines that is well established in sev-
eral European countries and in South America. 
These penalties, called "day fines," are em-
ployed following a logical method that first 
determines the severity of the offense, then 
applies units of punishment based on the 
offender's daily wages-hence, "day fines." 
systematic incorporation of "intermediate 
sanctions"2 into sentencing systems, pri-
marily in response to pressing justice and 
fiscal concerns. The financial implications 
of getting tough on crime have spurred 
interest in creating a graduated progression 
of intermediate penalties. 
Until recently, the fine was not a promi-
nent intermediate penalty in the United 
States because of deep skepticism among 
American criminal justice professionals . 
Skeptics doubted the ability of judges to 
set fines in amounts large enough to punish 
and deter while making the fines fair to 
offenders with vastly different economic 
circumstances. Doubters also questioned 
the courts' ability to enforce and collect 
such fines. 3 
The skepticism is beginning to dissipate, 
however, as more American courts explore 
fining systems that systematically vary fine 
amounts in relation to the means of the 
This Research in Brief describes an evalua-
tion of the first experiment in the United 
States in implementing a day-fines system, 
an NIJ pilot project on Staten Island, New 
York, which took place between 1988 and 
1990. As this Brief shows, this sentencing 
alternative should prove valuable in other 
jurisdiCtions as well. 
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How Day Fines Work 
The general concept is simple: deter-
mining the amoWlt of punishment to 
be administered to an offender is 
separated from a consideration of 
how much money that offender must 
pay. Judges determine how much 
punishment an offender deserves; 
this is then denominated in some unit 
other than money. These punishment 
units are translated into monetary 
terms based on how much money the 
offender makes per day. 
Practically speaking, the day fine 
approach consists of a simple, two-
step process. First, the court uses a 
"unit scale" or "benchmark" to sen-
tence the offender to a certain num-
ber of day-fine units (for example, 
15, 60, or 120 units) according to the 
gravity of the offense and without 
regard to income. To guide the 
court's choices, benchmarks or unit 
scales are typically developed by a 
planning group of judges, prosecut-
ing attorneys, and defense counselors 
familiar with disposition patterns in a 
court. 
The value of each unit is then set at a 
percentage of the offender's daily 
income, and the total fine amount is 
determined by simple multiplication. 
offender as well as the severity of the 
offense-systems with which some Euro-
pean courts have long experience. 
The variable fine systems used in Europe 
are typically called "day fines" because 
some portion of an offender's daily income 
is used to calculate the fine amount. This 
differs greatly from the typical fixed flat-
fine system used in American courts (see 
"How Day Fines Work," above). In setting 
fine amounts, American judges generally 
apply "going rates" or "tariffs" based upon 
understandings (usually informal) that the 
same or similar amounts are imposed 
on all defendants convicted of similar 
offenses. 
Such tariff systems have limited the useful-
ness of the fine as an intermediate sanction 
in the United States because tariffs tend to 
be set to reflect the lowest common eco-
nomic denominator of offenders coming 
before the court. This practice depresses 
fine amounts, diminishes the punitive 
weight of fines for better-off offenders, and 
constricts the range of offenses for which 
judges view a fine as an appropriate sole 
sanction. 
Day fines, on the other hand, ensure the 
routine imposition of fines that are propor-
tionally punitive-based on the serious-
ness of the offense-and equitable for 
offenders with differing means.4 
Implementation of the 
day-fine experiment 
In evaluating the implementation of the 
day-fine system in Staten Island, NIJ's 
researchers concluded that the program 
was successfully initiated.5 Judges were 
able to obtain the offender income infor-
mation they needed to set the fine amount 
promptly without disrupting the rapid flow 
of cases. Once trained to use the day-fine 
workbook they had helped develop, judges 
found the mechanics of computing a day-
fine sentence simple. No practical or ideo-
logical opposition to the principle was 
voiced by either prosecutors or defense 
attorneys. 
The sole implementation problem encoun-
tered was one the planners had anticipated: 
Statutory fine maximums in New York 
State are very low and have not increased 
since 1965. In a significant number of 
cases, the day-fine amounts calculated by 
judges for more affluent offenders con-
victed of more serious violations exceeded 
the statutory limit. 
In these instances, the judge sentenced the 
defendant to the statutory maximum but 
recorded the day fine as calculated. This 
established a record for later use in the 
legislative process, where more wide-
spread use of day fines in New York State 
hinges on statutory changes to increase the 
existing fine limits. 
Goals of the evaluation 
The evaluation tested the impact of day 
fines on the court's sentencing patterns and 
sought to determine: 
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e Whether the theoretical complexity of 
the day fine or the burden of its two-stage 
procedure decreased the use of fines. 
• Whether the use of fines shifted from 
one type of offense to another. 
• Whether, on average, day-fine amounts 
were higher than the previous fixed fines 
and, if so, whether this had any negative 
effect on the existing high collection rate. 
• Whether the day fine alone or in concert 
with new collection techniques had any 
impact on collection outcomes. 
In addition, the research developed a 
model in an attempt to predict the sen-
tences offenders would have received if 
there had not been a day-fine option. 
Analysis of this kind can provide a basis 
for gauging the extent to which introducing 
day fines displaces other types of sentences 
or replaces existing fixed fines. 6 
Evaluation design 
The design chosen for this evaluation was 
a before-and-after comparison of penal-
Jaw felony and misdemeanor arrests dis-
posed of in the Staten Island Criminal 
Court both before the introduction of day 
fines and during the day-fine project's pilot 
year. The sample from before the experi-
ment consisted of all penal-law cases dis-
posed of before the start of the day-fine 
pilot, from April I, 1987, through March 
31, 1988; there were 4,461 cases in this 
sample.7 The pilot-year sample consisted 
of all cases disposed of during the pilot 
year, from September 1, 1988, through 
August 31, 1989; there were 4,883 cases 
in this sample.8 
During the pilot year, researchers also 
tested the impact of new collection proce-
dures introduced as part of the day-fine 
program. Part of the Staten Island pilot 
project was a new collection and supervi-
sion component that developed individual-
ized collection schedules and stressed 
prompt notification of payments due and 
missed. This was in contrast to the conven-
tional method of collection, in which cases 
not fully paid at sentencing were continued 
on the court calendar, with subsequent 
hearings set infrequently and arrest war-
rants issued if offenders failed to appear. 
To compare the effects of day fines with-
out the new collection techniques, the 
fixed-fine system with the new collection 
techniques, and the new day fines in com-
bination with the new collection tech-
niques,9 day-fine cases were randomly 
assigned to two groups after sentencing: 
The "experimentals" were those day-fine 
cases processed according to the experi-
mental collection procedures; the "con-
trols" were day-fine cases handled using 
the collection process routinely adminis-
tered by the court. 
Comparisons of collections between 
the day-fine experimentals and the pre-
day-fine cases measured the effect of intro-
ducing new day-fines along with new col-
lection techniques. Comparisons between 
the "controls" and cases from the year 
prior to the experiment measured the inde-
pendent effect of introducing day-fine 
sentences without the new collection pro-
cedures. Comparing collection outcomes 
for the "experimentals" with the "controls" 
measured the effect of the new collection 
procedures alone. 
A variety of analyses were performed. 
Prior to any before-and-after comparisons 
being made, the 2 years' samples were 
compared with regard to arraignment 
charge; the two samples were found to be 
statistically equivalent given the mix of 
cases coming into the court. 
Impact on sentencing 
Day fines were successfully intro-
duced into routine sentencing in the 
Staten Island court during the pilot 
year. 
The mechanics of imposing a day fine 
consist of establishing the number of day-
fine units based upon the offense and esti-
mating the offender's net daily income and 
number of dependents to calculate the 
monetary value of each unit. This process 
was neither too complex nor too time-
consuming to be applied routinely in a 
relatively fast-paced criminal court. Two-
thirds of the fixed fines in penal law cases 
were replaced by day fines during the pilot 
year. 
Those fixed fines assessed during the ,pilot 
year were imposed by non-Staten Island 
judges sitting temporarily as replacements 
for vacationing or sick colleagues; these 
judges had not been trained to use day 
fines and, therefore, used the traditional 
tariff system in setting fine amounts. 
The introduction of day fines did not 
appreciably affect judges' sentencing 
decisions during the pilot year. 
When prior conviction records and arraign-
ment charges were controlled, overall sen-
tencing patterns remained steady during 
the year in which day fines were applied. 
The only noticeable change in sentencing 
patterns was a small increase in jail sen-
tences for some drug cases, a change that 
occurred during the height of the crack 
cocaine epidemic in New York City. 
Therefore, it appears safe to surmise that 
the introduction of day fines did not create 
this shift in sentencing. 
After introduction of the day fine, 
average fines imposed for penal law 
offenses rose 25 percent. 
Fines rose from $205.66 before the experi-
ment to $257.85 during the year in which 
the day fines were introduced. However, if 
day fines had not been restrained by statu-
tory maximum fine limitations, the average 
fine during the pilot period would have 
been $440.83-more than twice the aver-
age fixed fine amount ($205.66). Even if 
these uncapped day fines were combined 
with fixed fines imposed during the pilot 
year, the overall average fine amount 
would have risen 84 percent in the experi-
mental year (table 1). 
The total amount of the fines im-
posed by the court in penal law cases 
increased by 14 percent during the 
pilot year (from $82,060 to $93,856). 
The impact of the day-fine system on total 
fine revenue would have been even more 
dramatic if day fines had not been con-
strained by statutory maximums. In the 
absence of the caps, the total amount of 
fines in the experimental year would have 
been almost 50 percent higher than the 
total amount actually ordered (rising from 
$93,856 to $137,660). This would have 
represented a 67-percent increase over the 
total fine amount ordered the year before 
the experiment (table 1). Using day fines 
could potentially raise revenues, provided 
that the higher rates did not inhibit collec-
tion of the fines. 
As expected, there was more varia-
tion among individual fine amounts 
when they were calculated using the 
day-fine system. 
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The judges relied substantially less on 
traditional tariffs and calculated day fines 
with more gradations, many of which fell 
above the statutory fine maximums. Fur-
thermore, as seen in table 1, during the 
pilot year the fines that fell between the 
tariff points were, for the most part, day 
fines. 
Changes in collection rates 
and patterns 
The Staten Island pilot study demonstrated 
that by taking into account an offender's 
ability to pay when the fine amount is set, 
the levied fine is collectible and propor-
tionate to the severity of the offense. 
Despite the substantial increase in 
average fine amounts, introduction 
of the day-fine system did not under-
mine the court's high collection 
rates. 
Introducing day fines into the Staten Island 
court did not significantly alter collection 
rates, despite substantially higher average 
fines (table 2). In 85 percent of the day-
fine experimental cases (those subject to 
the new collection strategy and the day 
fine) and in 71 percent of the day-fine 
control cases (those disposed of using the 
collection process routinely administered 
by the court), the offender eventually paid 
in full, compared to 76 percent of the fine 
cases from the year before the experiment. 
These differences are not statistically 
significant. 
However, when a comparison is made of 
cases in which fined offenders paid noth-
ing, it is apparent that the new collection 
procedures significantly improved collec-
tion outcomes: Only 6 percent of day-fine 
experimental cases resulted in no payment 
at all, compared to 22 percent of cases 
prior to the experiment and 26 percent of 
day-fine control cases. And when full 
payment was not made, some payment was 
much more likely in the day-fine experi-
mental cases than in the cases from before 
the experiment or in the day-fine control 
cases. 
These data suggest that the higher average 
fine amounts levied in the day-fine cases 
did not make collection more difficult for 
the court and that the new enforcement 
Table 1. Comparison of Fine Amounts Levied in Pilot Year, Capped by Statutory Maximums and Uncapped 
Capped Uncapped 
Pre-day-fines Day fines and Day fines only Day fines and Day fines only 
pilot flat fines flat fines 
n % n % n % %of n % n 0/o %of total* total* 
$1-24 1 0.3 1 0.3 1 0.4 100.0 1 0.3 1 0.4 100.0 
$25 33 8.3 4 1.1 3 1.3 75.0 4 1.1 3 1.3 75.0 
$26-49 - - 4 1.1 4 1.7 100.0 4 1.1 4 1.7 100.0 
$50 69 17.3 29 8.0 12 5.0 41.4 29 8.0 12 5.0 41.4 
$51-74 2 0.5 6 1.6 4 1.7 66.7 6 1.6 4 1.7 66.7 
$75 34 8.5 15 4.1 10 4.2 66.7 15 4.1 10 4.2 66.7 
$76-99 - - 9 2.5 8 3.3 88.9 9 2.5 8 3.3 88.9 
$100 78 19.5 38 10.4 22 9.2 57.9 38 10.4 22 9.2 57.9 
$101-149 1 0.3 15 4.1 14 5.8 93.3 15 4.1 14 5.8 93.3 
$150 14 3.5 18 4.9 11 4.6 61.1 18 4.9 11 4.6 61.1 
$151-199 3 0.8 11 3.0 10 4.2 90.9 11 3.0 10 4.2 90.9 
$200 22 5.5 18 4.9 11 4.6 61.1 18 4.9 11 4.6 61.1 
$201-249 8 2.0 9 2.5 6 2.5 66.7 9 2.5 6 2.5 66.7: 
$250 79 19.8 124 34.0 84 35.0 67.7 56 15.4 16 6.7 28.6 
$251-499 8 2.0 12 3.3 8 3.3 66.7 37 10.2 33 13.8 89.2 
$500 22 5.5 22 6.0 12 5.0 54.5 17 4.7 7 2.9 41.2 
$501-999 4 1.0 7 1.9 6 2.5 85.7 37 10.2 36 15.0 97.3 
$1,000 21 5.3 22 6.0 14 5.8 63.6 16 4.4 8 3.3 50.0 
$1 ,001+ - - - - - 0.0 - 24 6.6 24 10.0 100.0 
Total 399 100.0 364 100.0 240 100.0 65.9 364 100.0 240 100.0 65.9 
Total fines $82,060.55 $93,856.00 $61,994.00 $137,660.00 $105,798.00 
ordered 
Average $205.66 $257.85 $258.31 $378.19 $440.83 
*This percentage was calculated, for each fine amount, by dividing the number of day fines of that amount by the total number of fines of 
that amount, to determine what percentage were day fines. 
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procedures independently improved collec-
tion rates. 
While the introduction of day fines 
did not diminish the court's success 
in collecting fines, day fines did take 
longer to collect than fiXed fines 
prior to the experiment. 
Day fines, both with and without the new 
collection techniques, took longer to col-
lect than the earlier tariff-only fines (table 
2). This pattern was closely related to the 
higher average day-fine amounts. The 
mean number of days to full payment was 
significantly fewer for fines before the 
experiment (55 days) than for either the 
day-fine experimentals (114 days) or con-
trols (119 days). The longer collection 
period for day fines is not surprising in 
.light of the substantially higher average 
fine amounts imposed. 
Despite these higher fine amounts and 
longer periods before payment, the use of 
day fines, when coupled with the new 
collection techniques, did not increase the 
number of postsentence court appearances 
during the enforcement period. As in-
tended, the new collection techniques kept 
tined cases off the court calendar until the 
end of collection and enforcement activi-
ties. While fines before the experiment had 
required an average of 1.96 postsentence 
appearances, the day-fine experimentals 
required 1.76 such appearances. However, 
in day-fine cases in which the court's 
conventional collection procedures were 
used, the higher average fine amounts did 
require more court appearances (2.66). 
Thus, without the more individualized 
collection techniques used in the pilot 
program's experimental cases, day-fine 
offenders were brought back to court for 
nonpayment more frequently than either 
the fine cases before the experiment or the 
day-fine experimentals. 
The day-fine program significantly 
reduced the number of arrest warrants 
issued for failure to appear at post· 
sentence hearings. 
The court issued fewer arrest warrants for 
nonpaying day-fine experimentals who 
failed to appear for scheduled court hear-
ings. The day-fine experimental cases 
averaged 0.26 warrants, in comparison to 
the cases sentenced before the experiment 
0.55 warrants) and day-fine controls 
Table 2. Summary of Collection Rates, Collection Patterns, and 
Enforcement Outcomes 
---· 
Day-fine Day-fine 
Fixed finesb experimentalsc controlsd 
Percent paid in full at sentencing 16% 8% 17% 
Amount paid as percent of amount due: 
Percent paid nothing 22% 6%* 26%* 
Percent partial payment 2% 9%* 3%* 
Percent ever paid in full 76% 85% 71% 
Mean number of days to full payment 55 114* 119* 
Mean number of total appearances• 1.96 1.76 2.66* 
Mean number of warrants ordered• .55 .26* .83* 
Percent paid in full at 9 months• 72% 37%* 49%* 
Enforcement outcomes: 
Percent paid in full 76% 85% 71% 
Percent absconded 11% 6% 14% 
Resentenced or jailed 10% 6% 14% 
Unresolved 3% 3% 1% 
aThese variables reflect Information as of 9 months after sentence, thus controlling for the 
followup time period. The other variables did not need to be so constructed because they 
reflect information about the final case outcome. Thus, to have equal followup periods for 
each year, 7-month subsets of each year were created , allowing for 17 to 23 months of 
followup. 
bFixed-fine cases were taken from the year before the pilot year. 
cExperimentals are those cases that were subject to new collection procedures as 
well as day fines. 
dControls are those cases subject to standard collection procedures as well as day fines. 
*Indicates comparisons, whether of fixed-fine cases vs. experimentals, fixed-fine vs. 
controls, or experimentals vs. controls, in which p < .05. 
(0.83), as shown in table 2. These data 
suggest that when the old collection tech-
niques were used in conjunction with day 
fines, which were higher on average than 
the fixed fines, the court did have to rely 
more heavily on warrants to collect the 
fines. 
Despite significantly higher average fine 
amounts and longer collection periods, day 
fines were collected at rates as high as 
those for the smaller fixed fines. For those 
offenders who did not pay in full, signifi-
cantly more day-fined offenders paid 
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something as opposed to nothing. Thus, 
jurisdictions that implement a day-fine 
system can expect to successfully collect 
the additional revenue associated with a 
day-fine system. 
Further, the new collection techniques 
piloted in Staten Island could compensate 
for the decreased collection and enforce-
ment some jurisdictions might expect from 
raising fine amounts. The individualized 
collection strategy had the following ad-
vantages over the court's routine collection 
procedures: 
• More extended terms for payment of the 
larger day fines. 
• Fewer costly court appearances. 
• Fewer warrants for nonappearance at 
postsentence hearings. 
Jurisdictions whose existing collection sys-
tems are similar to Staten Island's can ex-
pect collection rates to remain stable after 
introducing a day-fine system of similar de-
sign. However, if jurisdictions experience 
additional court appearances and warrants 
as a result of the average higher fines gen-
erated by a day-fine system, they might 
need to devote more resources to collection 
efforts. Thus, shifting to individualized col-
lection systems when introducing day fines 
(a shift that ought to be financially feasible 
because day fines are likely to generate 
higher total fine revenues) would probably 
be the best approach for other American 
courts wishing to implement the day-fine 
concept. 
The relationship between 
income and fine amount 
Under the day-fine system, individual 
income plays a greater role in deter-
mining the fine amount, even when 
other factors are controlled. 
As expected, various factors influence fine 
amounts. These factors include the severity 
of the arraignment charge, the offender's 
income, and whether the penalty was a 
fixed fine or a day fine. Fine amounts in-
creased for more severe charges, for higher 
individual income, and for day fines as 
compared to fixed fines. 
Further, income has more effect on fine 
amount when the severity of the arraign-
ment charge is controlled arid the statutory 
maximums are set aside. But because the 
effect of income level can be seen in fixed-
fine cases as well as in day-fine cases, it 
appears that implementing the day-fine 
pilot standardized and made explicit the 
decisionmaking principles that were al-
ready in place. Under the day-fine system, 
this "calculus" was explicit and systematic, 
resulting in more uniform sentencing. 
Low-income offenders were no bet-
ter or worse at complying with day-
fine sentences than with tariff-fine 
sentences. 
Similarly, offenders sentenced to high or 
low day fines generally did as well pay-
ing the fines as those who received the 
lower fixed fines before the experiment. 
Although the average day-fine amounts 
were higher, they were no more likely to 
exceed any group of offenders' ability to 
pay and did not disproportionately increase 
the burdens on low-income offenders. 
However, the numbers were too small 
for significant testing, and this finding 
needs to be confirmed through additional 
research. 
Conclusion 
Through the introduction of day fines, it is 
quite possible that judges have become 
more comfortable with the imposition of 
monetary penalties when the amounts 
can be adjusted to individual cases and 
circumstances. 
With a means-based method for setting 
fines, fairer punishments were meted out 
without making the process of imposing 
fines too difficult or time-consuming for 
judges. Further, average fine amounts were 
higher under the day-fine system without 
undermining the court's collection rates. 
The day-fine approach has the potential 
added benefit of raising total collected fine 
revenues. Using a two-step procedure to 
set fine amounts so that they systematically 
reflect the gravity of offenses and offend-
ers' means eliminates most of the objec-
tions usually raised about use of monetary 
penal sanctions. The door may now be 
open to wider acceptance and use of mon-
etary sanctions in the United States. In-
deed, the results from Staten Island have 
encouraged adaptation of the day-fine 
concept in American jurisdictions outside 
New York. 10 
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Notes 
1. The Staten Island Criminal Court is a lower 
court-a trial court of limited jurisdiction. 
2. Castle, M.N. 1991. "Alternative Sentencing: 
Selling It to the Public," NIJ Research in 
Action; MacKenzie, Doris L., and James M. 
Shaw, "Inmate Adjustment and Change During 
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tional Boot Camp Programs," Justice Quar-
terly, 7, l(March 1990):125-150; Morris, 
Norval, and Michael Tonry, 1990. Between 
Prison and Probation-Intermediate Punish-
ments in a Rational Sentencing System, New 
York, Oxford University Press; Joan Petersilia, 
and Susan Turner, 1990.1ntensive Supervision 
for High-Risk Probationers: Findings From 
Three California Experiments, Santa Monica, 
RAND Corporation; Dennis Wagner, and 
Christopher Baird, "Evaluation of Florida 
Community Control Program," NIJ Research 
in Brief, (forthcoming). 
3. Hillsman, S.T. 1990. "Fines and Dayfines." 
In M. Tonry and N. Morris (eds.), vol. 12, 
Crime and Justice: A Review of Research. 
Chicago, University of Chicago Press. 
4. Greene, J. The Day-Fine System: A Tool for 
Improving the Use of Economic Sanctions, 
New York, Vera Institute of Justice, March 
1992. 
5. For more on implementation ofthe Staten 
Island day-fine experiment, see Judith Greene, 
"The Staten Island Day-Fine Experiment," Part 
II of Day Fines in American Courts: The 
Staten Island and Milwaukee Experiments, ed. 
Douglas C. McDonald, Washington, D.C., NIJ 
Issues and Practices, April1992. 
6. Project planners focused on demonstrating 
whether the day fine could be implemented and 
substituted for fixed fines but did not, in this 
first test of the idea, encourage the court to 
displace other sentences with day fines. 
7. Because imposition of statutory fine 
minimums is required for the serious traffic 
cases heard in this court (for example, driving 
while intoxicated [DWI]), they were eliminated 
from the research. Although theoretically 
possible, it is more complicated to calculate 
day fines for cases in which judges are required 
to set a specific fixed amount. In this first 
implementation attempt, it was not feasible to 
address this more complex issue. This was a 
necessary but unfortunate limitation of the pilot 
because it is likely that a significant number of 
'1WI offenders would be fined more than the 
ittutory minimum (the typical tariff rate) 
under a day-fine system. 
8. This research sample differs by several 
weeks from the sample of cases followed by 
program operators/planners during the .pilot 
year and discussed by Judith Greene in Day 
Fines in American Courts, n. 5 above. 
9. Because the new fining technique and the 
new collection method were introduced 
simultaneously, it was important to separate the 
effects of each reform on collection outcomes. 
10. Over the past several years, seven 
jurisdictions began to implement day-fine 
systems. Maricopa County in Arizona was the 
first; the other six-four sites in Oregon and 
one each in Iowa and Connecticut-are taking 
part in a Bureau of Justice Assistance project 
through which technical assistance is provided 
to sites implementing day fines. 
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